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Time Creators and Time Creatures in the Ethics of World Politics 
 
Truth as the Father of Time 
 
Rousseau’s jibe, that Hobbes showed us not man but Englishmen in a state of nature, 
makes a profound and perennially relevant point about the nature of rationalist 
theorising about ethics and politics. Specifically here my concern is with ethical 
theorists who believe that answers to ethical questions about world politics can be 
arrived at through the exercise of impartial reason at the level of ideal theory, often 
using thought experiments as a way of clarifying and resolving moral dilemmas about 
war or global justice (see Hutchings 2010: 28-53 for an overview of rationalist ethical 
theories; Simmons 2010 for a discussion of the ideal/ non-ideal theory distinction). 
Thought experiments construct scenarios in order to test out moral intuitions, and may 
range from Singer’s famous use of the example of the passing adult’s obligation to 
save a child from drowning in order to demonstrate the moral obligations of the 
globally affluent towards the starving (Singer 1972) to increasingly fantastical 
articulations of the ‘trolley problem’ to tease out circumstances in which killing the 
innocent may be justified (see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trolley_problem ). This 
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kind of moral reasoning is particularly characteristic of certain trends in cosmopolitan 
moral theory based on deontological, consequentialist or contractualist assumptions, 
especially recent developments in the ethics of war (see McMahan 2009; Fabre 2012).  
 
As critics of ideal theory have persistently pointed out, the principles, actors and 
situations that make up the worlds of thought experiments tend to reflect and 
incorporate assumptions that are specific to the time and place of the theorist, whether 
the theorist is conscious of this or not (Mills 2005; Miller 2008). In what follows I 
suggest that one such set of assumptions that remains in place, and continues to do a 
lot of work in the articulation and reception of rationalist international ethical and 
political theory, is a set of assumptions about the temporality of world politics.  The 
ways in which traditions of moral thought are mobilised in ethical rationalism is 
indifferent to historical context. But this very indifference is premised on assumptions 
about time and the role of the theorist in relation to it that are highly historically 
specific. They are assumptions that follow from the subsumption of moral theory 
under an epistemic, Baconian model of science (Hutchings 2008: 32-34). On this 
account, truth (science) has priority over time (nature) and provides the key to 
controlling and making time (second nature). Within this worldview, as I have 
explained elsewhere, the temporality of the ethical and political present (within the 
possible worlds of ethical argumentation and thought experiment) is a temporality of 
creative action in which creative time-making (Kairos) imposes itself on natural, 
chronological time (Chronos). In keeping with Baconian rationalism, agents within 
the simplified worlds of ethical theory, who are depicted as making decisions about 
what it would be right to do in particular situations (eg. when faced with choices 
between killing and letting die in the contest of war) are, insofar as they enact true 
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principles, time-makers. This temporal positioning is confirmed by the fact that the 
imagined situations in which agents in these scenarios are caught, necessitate that the 
capacity to master time is not universally shared. Shadowy ‘other’ actors accompany 
the moral agents in the spotlight of the possible world. Without these other actors, 
there is no situation, there are no moral dilemmas and questions.  
 
The focus in scenarios imagined by ethical theorists is on the question of what it 
would be right in certain situations for moral agents to do, but in order for this 
question to be raised moral agents require the presence of those who are not 
competent moral agents in the fullest sense. They are the mistaken, the wicked, the 
ignorant and the incapable. Without them, no moral dilemmas would arise. The 
temporality of the simplified world of ethical thought experiments, therefore, is 
double and paradoxical, it is one in which time creators and time creatures share and 
do not share the same temporality of action, the (hypothetical) present. This 
unevenness is underlined by the abstracted practices and institutions that also shape 
the situation, and that reflect a skew towards the perspective of those moral agents for 
whom certain questions are particularly relevant. Questions about the criteria for 
intervention, about who should be killable and who not, about whether there is an 
obligation to give aid, to reform global governance, or to redistribute wealth. Such 
questions presuppose asymmetrical power relations within the simplified world and 
are addressed to the strong, who are strong in two interrelated senses: first in the sense 
that they are full moral agents; second, in the sense that they occupy positions of 
power.  
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The scenarios constructed by ethical theorists do their work at the level of ideal theory 
through the identification of the theorist (truth teller) and their audience with idealised 
moral agency. The purpose of the exercise is to illuminate what should be done in a 
context in which what ought to be done can be done. This means that the theorist and 
audience see their situation from the perspective of the time-makers. This 
identification is cemented through the examples and analogies used to bring the 
argument home. Where these illustrations are fictional, they typically place the moral 
agent in a relation in which moral hierarchy and asymmetrical power are obvious: 
adults and children; perpetrators and victims; punishers and criminals. Where these 
illustrations are historical, they typically draw on events specific to histories and 
experiences that will be familiar to theorist and audience. The reason, I suggest, why 
these kinds of illustrations are so important for rationalist moral and political theory is 
that they make clear the homology between the fictional temporality of the possible 
world of thought experimentation and unquestioned assumptions about the 
temporality of actual world politics, and thus enable theorist and audience to 
recognise themselves within the imagined scenarios through which they develop their 
arguments. These unquestioned assumptions not only presume a world in which the 
time of action is unevenly distributed, but map this uneven distribution so as to 
identify the truth that generates time with the time and place of the theorist and 
audience. Possible worlds incorporate precisely the assumptions of simultaneous 
equality and hierarchy that characterise predominant narratives of world politics and 
economics in the post-Cold War period. Moreover, they reproduce the same mapping 
of strength and weakness, goodness and badness and the same recipe for how 
weakness and badness may be addressed through the good offices of the strong and 
the good, the time makers amongst us. In effect, the possible world accomplishes for 
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moral rationalism, what philosophical history accomplishes for historicism, it grants a 
universal and unifying significance to the time making powers of western modernity 
for the world as a whole.  
 
 
The implications of the reproduction of the western moral imaginary for the practice 
of theory are evident in Singer’s previously cited argument for the moral requirement 
on individuals to give aid to famine victims. In order to make his point, Singer makes 
an analogy between the obligation for the affluent to give aid in a specified situation 
of famine in which certain conditions are assumed, and the obligation of an adult 
passing by to save a child from drowning in a puddle. Singer’s adult/ child analogy 
works powerfully to dramatise his point about the nature of the obligation of affluent 
westerners to aid victims of famine. But it does so by explicitly characterising the 
relation between the affluent west and the victim other in terms of a protective 
relation between the mature adult and the immature child. Singer’s argument could 
not be addressed to the victim/ child, because the latter is a subject position defined 
through incapacity, an incapacity that, by implication, is spiritual as well as material. 
What is being set up is not just a hierarchical way of seeing the world, but also the 
exclusion of victim/ child from the moral conversation, because in addition to being 
incapable of action, the victim/ child does not know anything morally or empirically 
valuable. This endows the ethical theorist and the addressees of his arguments with a 
position of ethical privilege, one that empowers both theorist and audience, within the 
moral imaginary of the simplified world, to act unilaterally because of their grasp of 
moral and empirical truth. Moral reasoning, on this account, becomes a profoundly 
hierarchical and exclusive business, even while it aims to forward universal principles 
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of moral equality. The moral equality of theorist, audience and hypothetical moral 
agents in the possible world is inseparable from a distinction between those who grasp 
moral equality as a truth and those that do not.  
 
To suggest that this is corrupting of the ambitions of rationalist cosmopolitan 
arguments may sound hyperbolic, but I do not think it overstates the case. It is 
corrupting because of its implicit identification of an audience capable of learning 
with those who already share the same world, and because of the limitations that it 
places on what can be learnt. And also because of the dispositional relations it sets up 
between moral theorists and those on behalf of whom they claim to speak - the 
shadowy, less than fully competent agents, who are stuck in time and not, by 
definition, going to learn from their role in the moral theorists’ thought experiments. 
The explicit purpose of such arguments is to provide critical standards for thought, yet 
scenarios are constructed in such a way that no fundamental shifting of established 
ways of thinking about the ethics of world politics is possible. Thus one may argue 
over the principles or even the permissibility of aid, development, resistant violence 
or humanitarian intervention, but always within the terms of moral and empirical 
reference points that are fused within a particular moral imaginary. Those terms keep 
meaningful conversation to a restricted group of participants – perhaps best captured 
by the term ‘the beneficent powerful’. To engage with the moral imaginaries of the 
vulnerable, the immature, the wicked, or the incapable would be to ‘go back’ to times 
that have been transcended by truth. Each time cosmopolitan ethical theorists replay 
their account of moral agency situated in the context of its shadowy others 
(perpetrators and victims), the moral superiority and historical advantage of the 
theorist and of their audience is reaffirmed.  
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The co-existence of equality and inequality in the worlds of moral rationalism is 
rendered comprehensible by being embedded in a temporal imaginary specific to 
Baconian assumptions about the relation between truth and time. Within this 
imaginary, the dispositional relation between the moral theorist and those on behalf of 
whom she speaks most commonly manifests itself in one of three modalities: 
protective; educative and punitive. Moral rationalists use their simplified worlds to 
enable identification between theorist, addressee and idealised moral agency. This 
means that they identify with the moral position, choices and dilemmas of the 
protector, the teacher and the law enforcer. This way of approaching ethical questions 
is epistemic and technocratic, for rationalist moral theorists the holder of moral truth 
within the possible world is beyond the reach of affect and power, and able to be 
effective in implementing the requirements of truth.  In this respect, although theorists 
and their addressees make mistakes, these mistakes are of a particular kind, they do 
not disturb the fundamental subject position of the truth teller and truth seeker. Of 
course, theorists know that they can get things wrong – as is evident from ongoing 
disputes between different rationalist positions – but they can never be fundamentally 
wrong in the world-shifting way that time creatures are wrong. At the same time as 
having a conversation between themselves, therefore, a hierarchical relation with 
others is being reproduced. In this respect, the moral sensibilities and sensitivities 
cultivated in the hypothetical worlds of moral rationalism are those of authority 
derived from superiority.  
 
Truth as the Daughter of Time 
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It might be argued that the corruption I identify follows not from the assumptions of 
moral rationalism but from the illicit smuggling in of elements of western bias into 
imagined worlds, for instance through the analogy between developed world and 
adult. If this is the case then it implies that a moral technocracy that can demonstrate 
to all what ought to be done through access to the realm of truth (beyond time) is a 
viable possibility. But unless the actual world has already achieved moral perfection 
from the point of view of all (in which case the moral technocracy would be 
redundant) then this would still leave the hierarchy between time creators and time 
creatures, and the reproduction of that world in place. Although it undoubtedly 
provides a way of ensuring rigorous clarification of what the truth is claimed be, any 
normative theory modelled on Baconian assumptions elevates those that grasp the 
truth over those that don’t. When it comes to normative theories about world politics 
it is hard to see how any particular band of moral technocrats can avoid reproducing 
the hierarchies that have enabled the leisure and provided the tools to exercise that 
technocracy in the first place. If we are to counter this tendency, then the chances are 
higher if rather than seeking to inhabit an imaginary that is completely out of this 
world, we replace Bacon’s vision of truth as the masculine progenitor of time with the 
alternative conceit of a feminised truth, the daughter of time, and use this to multiply 
the worldly imaginaries that are expressed in our hypothetical worlds.  
 
If moral truth is the daughter of time rather than its father, then there are no timeless 
ethical truths that have the capacity to make time, and the temporal parameters of 
judgment have to become an explicit focus of attention for international ethical and 
political theory. The coincidence of moral superiority and historical advantage that is 
rationalised in the possible worlds of moral rationalism (and the developmental 
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philosophies of history of liberalism and Marxism) relies on accounts of world 
political temporality as singular, unevenly progressive and led by the west. If this 
temporal framing is put into question, then so is the mutual reinforcement between 
claims to moral superiority and historical privilege, and therefore between moral 
superiority and particular ways of organising human relations: interpersonally, 
socially, economically and politically. If one is interested in doing international 
ethical and political theory in a way that does not take the modernist moral/ historical 
link for granted, then provincializing work is necessary. This is essentially work of 
disorientation and reorientation as part of the construction of moral imaginaries less 
hidebound by the assumptions that structure the possible worlds of rationalism. So, 
how is this to be done? And what are the implications in terms of the concerns of 
international ethical and political theory?  
 
First of all, the moral theorist has to recognise and acknowledge the moral imaginary that 
he or she takes for granted. Moral rationalism encourages the equation of a moral 
imaginary with a set of epistemic premises, but in practice no moral imaginary is 
confined to articulable ethical principles and values, it includes also assumptions about 
situations, about protagonists, about empirical facts, about lived experience and about the 
space and time of moral engagement. All of this, I suggest, when trying to think ethically 
about world politics is underwritten and made intelligible by a reading of world political 
time, a set of assumptions about the nature and meaning of the world political present in 
relation to past and future, and the place of one’s theoretical voice within that narrative. 
The process of disorientation I am recommending requires the rationalist moral theorist to 
leave the comfort zone of this identification between moral superiority and their own 
particular place and time and to embrace an ‘out of jointness’ in which their own 
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‘backwardness’ or ‘wickedness’ could be possible. This may sound like a reintroduction 
of some kind of transcendental move beyond time, but this would only be the case if the 
temporality of ethical judgment prevalent within the western academy is the only possible 
temporality, and if truth is the daughter not the father of time then that is something that 
could not self-evidently be the case. In fact we know it is not the case, in the banal sense 
that the moral superiority/ historical advantage story has not always framed ethical and 
political thinking and has been, and continues to be, consistently contested from inside 
and outside the political communities that have been its key proselytisers. The only way 
to suspend dependence on a particular reading of the present is to open up one’s moral 
imaginary to other orientations. Very often, historically, such opening up has been 
violently enforced rather than willingly embraced. Nevertheless, for most of the 
populations that occupy the shadowy ‘other’ positions in the possible worlds of moral 
rationalism, engagement between different moral imaginaries and different temporal 
orderings is commonplace. Borrowing Chakrabarty’s terminology, I have suggested 
elsewhere that international ethical and political theorists need to cultivate a 
heterotemporal orientation towards ethical judgment (Chakrabarty 2000; Hutchings 
2011). 
 
A heterotemporal orientation to cosmopolitanism decentres the position of the ethical theorist by 
questioning the assumption of a fusion between his or her particular present and ‘the’ present of 
world politics. It raises the question as to why, for example, humanitarianian intervention or the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ should be taken as a sign of the distinctiveness of the world-political 
present. For whom, and from whose perspective is this a novel development? Does it mark a 
normative difference in the conduct of world politics or simply confirm a set of longstanding 
patterns? To raise the question of novelty is to disturb the kinds of subjective certainty, of ‘at 
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homeness’ in thought, that render phenomena such as humanitarian intervention straightforwardly 
timely. In this respect, a heterotemporal orientation makes the work of the theorist much harder, 
since it requires the painful, political effort of cross-temporal engagement without the short cuts 
enabled by the taken for granted fusion of his or her particular present with the end of history.   
 
If humanitarian intervention is identified with the potential globalization of justice, then a 
heterotemporal orientation would suggest that what is needed is to begin by acknowledging and 
examining political temporalities of violation, in order to understand the meanings of injustice in 
the present. This would enable judgment of the likely effects of the institutionalisation of particular 
normative priorities in the principles and practices of international humanitarianism. But it would 
also open up the question of what kinds of violation matter and why, and offer a different route to 
the establishment of international hierarchies of outrage than that reflected in the moral priorities 
of existing international human rights regimes. Within predominant contemporary diagnoses of, 
and prescriptions for, world politics the problem is not that the co-existence of a plurality of 
orientations goes unrecognised, so much as that the meaning of this plurality is always already 
homogenised by reference to the authoritative space/time of western modernity. It is the subjective 
certainty of this orientation that not only grounds the theorist’s judgment but also enables it to 
make a difference in practice, through timely prescription and through example. Instead of being 
the one who already knows the time, the heterotemporally oriented theorist is fundamentally 
uncertain of his own punctuality (see Thaler 2014 for an attempt to complicate temporal 
assumptions in just war theory). The extent to which his interventions are or are not timely will 
depend on the moral/temporal certainties and uncertainties (orientations) of his interlocutors. To 
engage with alternative temporal framings for judgment is well within the limits of logical 
possibility, but to take seriously a challenge to one’s investment in a narrative of truth and progress 
that cannot live with provincialization, is profoundly disturbing for those of us educated in 
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rationalist traditions of moral theorizing. It is, however, the only way to shift the ground of ethical 
debate about world politics away from an agenda that is incapable of seriously questioning its own 
timeliness. 
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